Mardi 17 mars 2020 (Séance annulée) — Séminaire DYNAMICS

  • Michel Beine (Univer­sity of Luxembourg) ;
  • Martin Raval­lion (Geor­ge­town University).
  • 16:30–19:00 ;
  • PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09.

Michel Beine (Univer­sity of Luxembourg)
Asses­sing the Role of Immi­gra­tion Policy for Foreign Students : the Case of Campus France (travail conjoint avec Lionel Ragot)

This paper studies the intended and unin­tended effects of a specific policy conducted by the French Govern­ment around 2006 aiming at boos­ting the number of foreign stu- dents admitted in French univer­si­ties. The Campus France program aimed at facili- tating the appli­ca­tion process of foreign candi­dates from some parti­cular coun­tries and applying in specific univer­si­ties. We develop a small theo­re­tical model that allows for the exis­tence of capa­city constraints in order to analyse the poten­tial effects of such a policy in terms of student inflows and in terms of selec­tion. Using a Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff approach, we test the impact of Campus France on the magni­tude of inflows. We pay atten­tion in terms of hete­ro­ge­neity of these effects across types of univer­si­ties. We find that the Campus France policy led to a global increase of inflows of foreign students around 8%. The increase is concen­trated on univer­si­ties outside the top 150 of the Shan­ghai Ranking, sugges­ting a higher selec­tion from better univer­si­ties. We also use the CF policy as a way to test the poten­tial crow­ding-out effects on native students while taking care of the usual endo­ge­neity concerns in terms of loca­tion. We do not find any impact of crow­ding-out, either on native students or on foreign students coming through the tradi­tional channel.

Martin Raval­lion (Geor­ge­town University)
A Market for Work Permits (travail conjoint avec Michael Lokshin)

There is a huge poten­tial for economic deve­lop­ment through libe­ra­li­zing inter­na­tional migra­tion. However, it will be poli­ti­cally diffi­cult to realize that poten­tial without some form of protec­tion for host-country workers. The paper explores the scope for effi­ciently mana­ging migra­tion and refu­gees using a compe­ti­tive market for work permits. Host-county workers would be granted the legal option of renting out their implicit citi­zen­ship work permits for a period of their choice, while forei­gners purchase time-bound work permits. Aggre­gate labor supply need not rise in the host country. However, total output would rise and workers would see enhanced social protec­tion. Simu­la­tions for the US and Mexico suggest that the new market would attract many skilled migrants, boos­ting GDP and redu­cing poverty in the US.